In a move seen as a calculated signal to US President Donald Trump over his decision to impose a 50 per cent tariff on Indian imports, Prime Minister Narendra Modi made headlines at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin, China.
Modi not only held talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin but also joined him for a symbolic motor ride—underlining India’s intent to strengthen its “traditional” partnership.
“Even in the most difficult situations, India and Russia have always walked shoulder to shoulder,” Modi said.
“Russia and India have maintained special relations for decades. Friendly, trusting. This is the foundation for the development of our relations in the future,” said Putin.
Both leaders vowed to strengthen Indo-Russian ‘traditional’ ties further.
Roots of the Indo-Russian Bond
India’s ties with Russia stretch back to the early years of independence. The Soviet Union’s “official support” in the UN was most prominently displayed for the first time during the liberation of Goa in 1961.
On 19 December of that year, at the United Nations Security Council, Moscow stood firmly alongside New Delhi against the Western Bloc, led by the US, which was shielding Portugal’s colonial grip on Goa, Daman, and Diu.
Even as the United States dominated global affairs, it was the USSR’s veto that helped secure India’s integration of the territories after military action—popularly known as “Operation Vijay.”
Operation Vijay and the UN Showdown
After years of failed peaceful negotiations with Portugal and appeals made by the UN, amidst a legal battle at the International Court of Justice, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Defence Minister V.K. Krishna Menon strategised military action.
On the night of 17 December 1961, 15,000 Indian troops (15,000 more stationed at the border) marched into Goa, facing just 3,500 Portuguese soldiers.
A Portuguese naval warship headed to Goa was intercepted by Egypt at the Suez Canal, further isolating Lisbon. By 19 December, Portuguese forces had surrendered to the Indian Army.
Portugal then retaliated diplomatically, accusing India of aggression before the UN. An emergency meeting of the UN Security Council was convened on 19 December 1961.
Two resolutions were tabled:
- The Western Bloc’s Resolution, backed by the US, UK, France, and Turkey, called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and called upon India to withdraw her forces to the positions prevailing before 17 December 1961. It also urged India and Portugal to work out a permanent solution by peaceful means, with the assistance of the UN Secretary-General.
- The Afro-Asian Resolution, moved by Liberia, Ceylon, and the United Arab Republic, supported India. It stated that the enclaves claimed by Portugal in India constitute a threat to international peace and stand in the way of the integrity of the Republic of India. It thus asked the Security Council to reject the Portuguese charges of aggression against India and liquidation of her colonial possessions in India.
The first resolution by four countries of the Western Bloc was supported by three more countries: Chile, Ecuador, and China, making it an absolute majority of seven.
On the contrary, the three-member resolution supporting Goa’s liberation got support only from Russia, which was called the Soviet Union at that time.
But this one vote of the USSR (Russia) turned the tables because it was one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council: China, France, Russia, Great Britain, and the United States.
According to the UN constitution, all five permanent members enjoyed veto power, and no resolution could be passed even if one of these members opposed it.
Without that single vote of Russia, Goa might well have been handed back to Portugal despite India’s military victory.
Nehru’s Strategic Diplomacy with Moscow
The Soviet support was not a coincidence. Nehru had visited the USSR in June 1955, followed by the visit of First Secretary of the Communist Party Nikita Khrushchev to India later that year. Khrushchev openly declared Soviet support for India not just on Goa but also on Kashmir.
This was followed by Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev’s visit to India in December 1961, two days before the Indian Army entered Goa. On 18 December, in Bombay, he said that Russia had “complete sympathy for the Indian people’s desire to liberate Goa, Daman, and Diu from Portuguese colonialism.”
The next day, at the UN Security Council meeting, the Soviet Union went on to cast its 99th veto in India’s favour on Goa. Later, its 100th veto was also in support of India, on Jammu & Kashmir, blocking Western-backed ‘Irish resolution’.
Before this, in October 1961, Nehru had also mobilised Afro-Asian support at a Delhi seminar and a Bombay rally, declaring: “We tried all possible peaceful methods for 14 years. Now India will not hesitate to use armed forces to liberate Goa, Daman, and Diu.”
Echoes in Today’s Geopolitics
Six decades later, history is echoing. Just as the US once backed Portugal in Southeast Asia, Washington today pressures India to reduce reliance on Russian crude oil and weapons—slapping one of its highest tariffs under Trump’s trade policy.
Yet, as Nehru once leaned on Moscow to safeguard India’s sovereignty, Modi appears to be treading a similar path. By reaffirming India’s partnership with Russia—this time even alongside China, once a hostile neighbour—Modi signals that New Delhi will act in its own strategic interests, balancing global power plays much like India’s first Prime Minister did.
